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FETAL
JURISPRUDENCE-A
DEBATE IN THE
ABSTRACT
ROBERT J. ARAUJO
A SUBWAY CAR NAMED INQUIRE
Call it fate. Call it luck. Call it the will of God. Call it what you wish.
Allow me to explain. The United States Supreme Court is about to hear
oral argument on a case which may well address once and for all the is-
sues of abortion.' The status of cases such as Roe v. Wade,2 Doe v. Bol-
ton,3 and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services4 is now uncertain.
On the day of the argument, two lawyers of national prominence in-
volved with this case have coincidentally arrived at Washington, D.C.'s
National Airport at the same time. One is Thelma Aquino; she represents
an amicus curiae, The National Anti-Abortion Committee. The other is
Jarvis Tomkins; he represents another amicus curiae, The American
Abortion Alliance. Both counsel decide that it would be convenient to
take the Metro (the Washington subway) to the Supreme Court. Unbe-
knownst to them, they simultaneously arrive at the subway station and
enter the same car.
Since they are both absorbed in the notes they have prepared for oral
argument, neither sees that they are sitting opposite one another. As the
subway glides out of the airport station, the subway lights flicker, but
none of the passengers give this much attention. When the train halts at
the Pentagon Station, a large number of passengers disembark. As a re-
sult, both Aquino and Tomkins see one another. They have met before.
' Abortion has been a political issue since the 1960s, when proponents of dbortion reform
were challenging long standing state laws that dated back to the 19th century. R.
TATALOVICH & B. DAYNES, POLITICS OF ABORTION 1 (1981).
2 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
- 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
- 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
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Each acknowledges the other by politely smiling and nodding, but no
words are exchanged.
As the train whisks away from this station, the lights in. the cars
flicker more erratically and then begin to dim. The problem with the
lighting is so noticeable that most passengers fail to recognize that the
train is slowing down as it is about to pass under the Potomac River.
Then, without warning, the train abruptly halts and the lights go out.
Although there is no panic, a number of passengers verbally express some
mild concern.
A brief moment later, the emergency lighting is activated. The sub-
way engineer announces over the public address system that there has
been a minor malfunction with a switch. As a result, the train will have to
remain stationary until a qualified mechanic can get to the nearest sta-
tion and then walk through the tunnel to the disabled train. With apolo-
gies, the conductor attempts to quell the anxieties of the passengers by
stating that they should be on their way within a "short" time. A paleon-
tologist on her way to work at the Smithsonian Institute wryly smiles to
herself when she hears these words: "Compared with other epochs, the ice
age is also considered a short time," she thinks to herself.
Since the morning rush hour continues and the oral arguments on
the abortion case are not scheduled until the afternoon session, neither
Tomkins nor Aquino are particularly concerned about the delay. Both
had planned to work at the court library for the balance of the morning.
As the lighting conditions are not conducive to work, both counsel briefly
exchange pleasantries. In the meantime, the engineer's voice once again is
heard over the speakers: "Metro officials believe they have identified the
source of our mechanical failure and hope to have it corrected within the
next hour or two. We hope this delay will not inconvenience you in any
substantial way, and we hope to see you again real soon on Metro. Have a
nice day!"
Have a nice day! Passengers fantasize about vengeance, consider the
consequences of being late for work, or simply contemplate their fate be-
ing stranded several hundred feet underground. Have a nice day, indeed!
Since it is impossible to work without sufficient lighting, both counsel
begin a conversation about the case and the issues. Neither is reluctant to
discuss the case with the other. Besides, the briefs which have already
been submitted to the Court and exchanged with the parties and other
amici, pretty much detail their respective arguments and supporting ra-
tionales. Their conversation goes something like this:
"Well, do you think the Court will raise any questions about past
decisions, particularly Webster?" asks Tomkins.
"Could be," replies Aquino noncommittally. "I suppose that some of
FETAL JURISPRUDENCE 205
Justice Stevens'" discussion in his concurring and dissenting opinion
could come up again."
"Anything in particular?" inquires Tomkins.
"Well, yes. It should come as no surprise to you that my clients take
the view that Justice Stevens incorrectly applied a first amendment testin Webster.' He seems to equate the natural law doctrine that it is imper-
missible to terminate the existence of a fetus through an abortion with
certain religious doctrines.' As you can see from my brief, Justice Stevens
misunderstands the point: there is clearly a secular basis supporting most
statutes which hold that a fetus's life should not be terminated by
abortion."'
"Yes, yes, I read your brief and I must say I found your argument,
ah, interesting. But you really don't think the Court will accept your rea-
soning, do you?"
"Since we apparently have some time before this train will operate
and our trip will resume, I'll see if I can convince you of my point. Let mebegin by positing that there is a secular natural law argument supporting
anti-abortion legislation and regulation. Although this argument maydraw from the moral beliefs that are held and fostered by individualsholding certain religious beliefs, these moral beliefs do not promote reli-gious beliefs in any way that would violate the establishment clause of the
Id. at 3079-85 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
See id. at 3082-83 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Stevens
concluded that the Missouri statute involved in Webster did not have a secular purposebecause it declared that life begins at conception. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part). He opined that the statute's declaration coincides with certain tenets of the
Roman Catholic Church's view on natural law rights concerning human life as articulated by
St. Thomas Aquinas. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Because of this
coincidence, the Justice concluded that this portion of the statute is an indirect endorse-
ment of the tenets of a particular religion. Such endorsement violates the establishment
clause. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also infra note 8 (discuss-
ing relation among lawmaking, religious convictions, and establishment clause).
7 Id. at 3083 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Stevens labeled thepreamble "an unequivocal endorsement of a religious tenent." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring
part, dissenting in part).
' Professor Kent Greenawalt has thoughtfully examined the relationship between lawmak-
ing, religious convictions, and the establishment clause of the first amendment. See Greena-
walt, Religious Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 MIcH. L. REV. 352 (1985). My discussion willperiodically refer to the insights Professor Greenawalt has made concerning this relation-
ship. A central thesis advanced by Greenawalt is that legislation, and presumably the devel-
opment of any enforceable public policy, must be justified by secular objectives. Id. at 357.However, it is permissible to rely on religious convictions to help answer basic questions of
value that cannot be completely addressed by secular rational decision making. Id. As long
as the policy's goals can be justified on secular grounds, reliance on religious convictions to
mold decision making does not violate the establishment clause. Id.
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first amendment.9 These moral beliefs, moreover, are, as I shall demon-
strate in a few moments, justified by secular objectives. 0
Secondly, there is a secular-based argument against the claim of your
client and other pro-abortion advocates that a woman has a fundamental
constitutional right" to terminate any pregnancy. This second argument
establishes a foundation for the philosophical inquiry which I call fetal
jurisprudence."
"I am anxious to hear your arguments, counselor," Tomkins
challenged.
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ISSUE Is ELIMINATED
"All right. First of all, I think it important to recognize and under-
stand the fallacy that a statute which happens to reflect or parallel some
religious tenet automatically runs afoul of the establishment clause.12 If
my reasoning is sound and this position is accepted by the Supreme
Court, many statutes, rules, and regulations enacted by secular public
bodies which contain provisions that aim at goals shared by religious be-
liefs but which do not promote the religious beliefs themselves should not
be suspected of violating the establishment clause.
Take, for example, the claim that no intermediary can interfere with
the feminist position that a woman has a fundamental right to terminate
a pregnancy.13 If we borrowed from Justice Stevens' reasoning, I could
suggest that this feminist principle also violates the establishment clause
because it reflects certain Calvinist tenets.1 4 Similarly, government inter-
ference with the sale of certain foods and beverages arguably duplicate
dietary laws observed by Jews and Moslems.' 5 I am convinced that where
9 U.S. CONST. AMEND. I. The relevant text of the first amendment states that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof." Id.
" Greenawalt, supra note 8, at 357.
" Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3067 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
11 Id. at 3082 (Stevens, J., concurring part, dissenting in part). Justice Stevens admitted
that laws can coincide with tenets of certain religions without violating the establishment
clause. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
" See People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359, cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970); N. DOWNS, FROM CRIME TO CHOICE 5 (1985).
14 See generally 1 J. CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION bk, III, ch. I, see IV (J.
Allen trans. 1949) (1559) (Calvinist belief that there can be no human intermediary between
God and individuals parallels feminist view).
15 The point which I am making is that public authorities enact rules regulating the conduct
of people for secular reasons at the same time that religious rules enacted by sectarian au-
thority may also regulate the same or similar conduct. For example, secular authorities may
prohibit the sale and consumption of shellfish which is contaminated by Red Tide or mer-
cury poisoning. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 14:9-10 (shellfish consumption prohibited for reli-
gious reasons); Leviticus 11:10-:12 (same). Civil authorities might also regulate the con-
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state and federal statutes have independent secular bases for their exis-
tence, they should be free of the snare of the establishment clause
prohibition.'
"In the case of a statute regulating abortion on the grounds of pro-
tecting fetal life, this regulation should simply be free of the first amend-
ment prohibition where there is a secular foundation supporting the rule,
even though the rule might parallel certain religious beliefs."7 The fact
that the rule reflects, without implementing or enforcing, some religious
tenet is immaterial so long as the rule is independently justifiable on sec-
ular grounds and serves civil objectives."
It is also crucial, as we examine the abortion issue, to identify and
compare the respective rights of pregnant women and fetuses. We mustkeep in focus the actual definition of the rights actually specified by Roe
and its progeny. The right to an abortion, as defined by Roe, is neither
absolute 9 nor unqualified.20 Just as the right conferred by Roe is secular
in nature, so is the foundation for prohibiting abortion.
"I would now like to identify first of all what is the secular natural
law theory underlying my client's position, and, then, second, demon-
strate that it establishes that the fetus2 also has constitutionally pro-
tected rights. This second facet of the argument regarding fetal rights willillustrate that the fetus is a human entity. As a human entity, the fetus
shares with all other human entities a place in the chain of human devel-
opment and is arguably entitled to protection under the fourteenth
sumption of certain foods and alcoholic beverages which would parallel prohibitions of
Moslem dietary laws. See, e.g., THE KORAN, Suras "The Table", "The Cow" (certain meats
and "strong" drink prohibited). In these examples, the civil authorities have enacted theprohibitions to accomplish secular objectives; nonetheless, the civil prohibitions accomplish
the same results (i.e., abstinence from certain foods, etc.), albeit for different purposes, as
the religious laws. The civil prohibitions would run afoul of the establishment clause if they
were enacted to enforce sectarian beliefs. They do not violate the first amendment prohibi-
tion, however, if their goal is to protect people from contaminated foods or to prevent mi-
nors from consuming alcoholic beverages.
"8 Greenawalt, supra note 8, at 361, 392, 402.
" Id. at 380.
" Id. at 380, 402.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
20 Id. at 154-56; see Doe v. Bolton 410 U.S. 179, 208 (1973) (Burger, C.J., concurring). It is
important to realize that the abortion rights established by Roe are conferred to the consult-
ing physician, not to the woman herself. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-66. Under the language of Roe,it seems that the woman does not have a right to an abortion unless her physician deter-
mines, in the physician's professional medical judgment, that the pregnancy should be ter-
minated. See id.
" While medical science distinguishes between different stages of in utero human develop-
ment (zygote, embryo, fetus), I shall refer to all stages as belonging to fetal development.
Consequently, I shall use the term "fetus" where medical science might use zygote or
embryo.
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amendment, or at least is protected within the penumbra of fourteenth
amendment protections."'"
THE NATURAL LAW BACKGROUND
"Most understandings of natural law, including my own, begin with
some concept about law itself. Regardless of whether one subscribes to
positive"3 or natural' 4 theories of law, would you agree that law is funda-
mentally recognized and accepted as a means by which human conduct is
in some form or other regulated or subject to regulation?""
22 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-57. In Roe, the majority held that "[i]f this suggestion of per-
sonhood is established, the appellants case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life
would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment. The appellant conceded as much
on reargument. Id. (footnote omitted). Professor Donald H. Regan reaches a different con-
clusion. While he states that even if the fetus is considered to be a person under the four-
teenth amendment (which he concludes it is not), it would not necessarily follow that the
Constitution forbids abortion. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1641
(1979). Professor Regan further stated that: "The Fourteenth Amendment does not say that
the fetus is a person, but neither does [it] ... say that a state may not decide to regard the
fetus as a person, if the state so chooses." Id.
23 Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword define positive law by contrasting it with natu-
ral law. They state that "Positivists . . . like natural lawyers, are interested both in the
law-as-it-is and in the law-as-it-ought-to-be. They insist, however, that an objective science
of law requires that the law-as-it-is be defined and thereby identified in a morally neutral
fashion." Beyleveld & Brownsword, The Practical Difference Between Natural-Law Legal
Theory and Legal Positivism, 5 OXFORD J. L. STUD. 1, 3 (1984). Plato makes a contribution
to understanding legal positivism when Thrasymachos identifies justice (and the law it pre-
sumably implements) as being the exercise of power, i.e., authority and the enforcement of
its dictates through coercion (or the threat of coercion) are law. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, bk. I,
337a-339a.
24 Professor John Finnis, in his "bald assertion" of natural law defines it as: (1) a set of
basic practical principals which indicate the basic forms of human flourishing as goods to be
pursued and realized; (2) a set of basic methodological requirements of practical reasonable-
ness which distinguish sound from unsound practical thinking; and, (3) a set of general
moral standards. J. FINN1s, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 23 (1980). Professor Kent
Greenawalt defines traditional natural law as "the longstanding position in moral and legal
theory that human law is in some sense derived from moral norms that are universally valid
and discoverable by reasoning about human nature or true human goods." K. GREENAWALT,
CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 161 (1989). Professor A.P. d'Entreves sees natural law as
"man's quest for an absolute standard of justice... [that is] based upon a particular concep-
tion of the relationship between the ideal and the real . . . between what is and what ought
to be." A. P. D'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW 93 (1970).
25 Professor Finnis sees law as a straightforward application of universally valid require-
ments of reasonableness that are, in turn, related to goals designed to achieve human goods.
J. FINNIS, supra note 24, at 289. He also views law as ideally being guided by moral princi-
ples. Id. at 290. Professor Ronald Dworkin takes a somewhat different approach. He sees
law as an:
interpretive, self-reflective attitude addressed to politics in the broadest
sense . . . Law's attitude is constructive: it aims, in the interpretive spirit, to lay
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"Yes, I would generally agree with that understanding."
"In essence, then, law is a rule, or rules, established by an acknowl-
edged authority which has power to enforce those rules. There are com-
mon views about law shared by both positivists and natural lawyers. For a
positivist such as H.L.A. Hart, law declares that certain kinds of human
conduct are obligatory.26 For many natural lawyers, such as Thomas
Aquinas, law, too, is a rule or rules which govern human acts.17
"The distinction between these two schools or approaches to under-
standing law might be summarized as follows: the positivists see the law-
as-it-is, whereas the natural lawyers view the law-as-it-ought-to-be"s It is
the naturalist who also introduces into the law the concept of morality-
being-consistent-with-the-law.'9
"Some critics of natural law may suggest that there is an internal
conflict or inconsistency in natural law. They incorrectly assume all natu-
ral lawyers as saying that since human law is derived from some natural
law or natural principles, human law cannot be immoral. I do not think
that all natural lawyers assert that every law generated by human beings
is always moral or that it prohibits or encourages everything prohibited or
encouraged by natural law. Thomas Aquinas certainly acknowledged that
the laws which humans generate through their socio-legal institutions do
not always prohibit all things proscribed by natural law.s" He acknowl-
edged that the laws enacted by human authorities are not always just; in
fact, they can be and sometimes are unjust."1 This view of Aquinas is
principle over practice to show the best route to a better future, keeping the right
faith with the past. It is, finally, a fraternal attitude, an expression of how we are
united in community though divided in project, interest, and conviction.
R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 413 (1986).
26 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79 (1961). Professor Hart ultimately concludes thatlaw is a union of two types of rules, primary [impose duties] and secondary [confer powers].
Id.
27 Aquinas elaborated on his definition, as does Hart. For Aquinas, law is also conceived by
reason and promulgated with a view toward the common good. 1 T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THE-
OLIGICA pt. I-I, question 90, art. 4 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans. 1947).However, his simplest definition of law parallels Hart's: "[L]aw is a rule and measure of
acts, whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting." Id. at art. 1.
28 Beyleveld & Brownsword, supra note 23, at 3.
29 Id. Professor Dworkin takes a different view, but he still sees law and morality as being
mutually supportive of one another. The judicial process of deciding the more difficult cases
which arise within the law cannot escape a spirit of integrity which influences and perme-
ates judicial interpretation. For Dworkin, judicial interpretation seeks the best decision
based on political morality. R. DWORKIN, supra note 25, at 248, 258, 263.
30 T. AQUINAS, supra note 27, at question 96, art. 2. Specifically, Aquinas stated that: "The
natural law is a participation in us of the eternal law: while human law falls short of the
eternal law... [H]uman law does not prohibit everything that is forbidden by natural law."
Id.
3 Id. at art. 4. "Laws framed by man are either just or unjust. If they are just, they have
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echoed by contemporary natural law advocates."3
"But, more precisely, what is natural law?"
"I thought you'd never ask," joked Tomkins.
THE HISTORICAL CONCEPT OF NATURAL LAW
"As you know, Jarvis, I have a lot of respect for the contribution
Aquinas has made to the evolution of legal concepts. The fact that much
of his work may be reflected in some of the religious doctrines of the
Roman Catholic Church does not minimize the contribution he has made
to the evolution of secular legal principles. 3
"An important element of natural law which applies to the abortion
question, and upon which I shall elaborate more fully later, is that natu-
ral law leads people to perform in ways that are consistent with the final
end of humankind.
3 4
"A fundamental precept of natural law related to the end of human-
the power of binding in conscience... On the other hand, laws may be unjust . .. by be-
ing contrary to human good .... Id.
" John Finnis disputes Hart's contention that moral concepts of law such as natural law
"[dlen[y] legal validity to iniquitous rules...." H.L.A. HART, supra note 26, at 207. Finnis,
like Aquinas, advances the notion that the natural law tradition accords validity to iniqui-
tous legal rules: "[W]hether on the ground and in the sense that these rules are accepted in
the courts as guides to judicial decision, or on the ground and in the sense that, in the
judgment of the speaker, they satisfy the criteria of validity laid down by constitutional or
other legal rules, or on both these grounds and in both these senses." J. FINNIS, supra note
24, at 365.
33 Cf. Greenawalt, supra note 8, at 370-71, 396.
3, For Aquinas, this was happiness (knowing God) and contemplation of truth (which in-
cludes serving those who contemplate truth). See T. AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, chs.
XXV, XXXVII. This view about the end of mankind parallels, in part, Aristotle's concept
of eudaemonia. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICs, bk. I, ch. 7, 1097b. For Aristotle, happi-
ness is the final end which consists of the happy person attaining virtue. Id. ch. 10, 1100b.
This happiness is not really focused on satisfying ourselves but is, rather, focused on satisfy-
ing our neighbors. Id. bk. IX, ch. 9, 1170a. John Finnis has adopted some of Aristotle's
concept of happiness-as-other-centeredness by including other-directedness along with duty
and equality in his natural law concept of justice. J. FINNIS, supra note 24, at 160, 164.
Professsor Mary Ann Glendon, echoes the sentiment of other-directedness. She distin-
guishes between what she identities as a central theme of being an American (the over-
emphasis of individual liberty) and that of being a Canadian (the duty of being a good
neighbor). She uses this theme to illustrate how, among the Western democracies, it seems
that only Americans hold that there is an absolute right for a woman to have an abortion.
By contrast, she says that the general sentiment of other citizens of the Western world is to
pay more attention to the duties each person has to others rather than to one's self. Address
by Mary A. Glendon on "The Structure of Freedom: Correlations, Causes and Cautions" at
Boston College (Oct. 29-30, 1987). Finally, Professor Dworkin, in his assessment of what the
good in legal and political institutions should be, suggests that, along with other elements,
the law is a fraternal attitude, an "[e]xpression of how we are united in community though
divided in project, interest, and conviction." R. DwORKIN, supra note 25, at 413.
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kind is: do good and avoid evil.3" The doing of good, (and the correlative
avoidance of evil, provides for and cultivates virtuous human activities.36
"It is my ultimate position that human law should avoid evil and
promote that which is good to the members of the society who are gov-
erned by such law. A good to be achieved by law is promoting human
development, or flourishing. An evil to be avoided is frustrating this de-
velopment. I submit that aborting a fetus is antithetical to developing
human entities. Like other human entities who are more advanced in this
chain of development, the fetus should also be entitled to the good which
can be realized through its continued development. Restraining abortion
would, at least in principle, foster the future of the human community by
ensuring the existence of future generations.3" These are interests which
all members of society have and share with the other members, includingits future members.38 It would follow that human law should prohibit the
evil of harming individuals which directly correlates to the end of human-
kind and the common good.39 Aquinas specifically includes the taking of
" 1 T. AQUINAS, supra note 27, at question 94, art. 22. As Aquinas states, "the first principlein the practical reason is founded in the notion of good, that good is that which all things
seek after. Hence this is the first precept of law, that good is to be done and ensued, and
evil is to be avoided. All other precepts of natural law are based upon this." Id.
3 Id. at art. 3.
17 Assuming that people desire the continuation of the human species, and acknowledge this
as an end of society, protection of the fetus would seem to be an appropriate means of
accomplishing this goal. Thus, people from one generation would have a duty of providing
for future generations by having equal regard for future human interests as well as their
own. See generally GRIFFIN, TOWARD A SUBSTANTIVE THEORY OF RIGHTS, UTILITY AND RIGHTS(Frey ed. 1984). As I mention in the main text, this is an argument in principle. Given thehigh birth rate in some countries, the density of population in certain areas, and the generalincrease in the world's population, it would not be plausible to suggest that abortion would,
at this time, threaten the continuation of the species.
"8 Greenawalt, supra note 8, at 380. Professor Greenawalt suggests that protection of life,
including that of fetuses, may be vital to the shared interests of the human community. Hefurther opines that restriction on abortion "may be thought to protect life, the most obvious
and vital interest that members of the community have." Id.
19 The idea of the common good contains elements of mutuality and reciprocity, i.e., one
individual treating another person as the first would want to be treated. It is difficult toimagine that anyone alive today would take kindly to his or her own prenatal existence
being terminated by an abortion. By extending this concept of the common good as a mutu-
ality or reciprocity of treatment, it is also difficult to see how the person who would proba-
bly not have wanted his or her own fetus aborted can then turn around and argue that some
other fetus (and future person) can be aborted without interference or restriction. See K.
GREENAWALT, supra note 24, at 162. Mutuality and reciprocity suggest that the common
good is essential to the preservation of the human community, both its current and future
membership. Yet, as Alasdair MacIntyre has indicated, the idea of society and "the political
community as a common project is alien to the modern liberal individualist world." A.
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 156 (1981). John Finnis has raised similar concerns about theimportance of the common good. He sees a social as well as an individual facet to the com-
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human life as such an evil that the law is designed to avoid."'
"I submit that abortion is an evil that contravenes natural law be-
cause termination of fetal development interferes with the end of human-
kind, including the maintenance of the species. Before I look at the status
of the fetus within the context of secular natural law and the end of hu-
mankind, let me first make a contrast between a postivist legal system
(the law is valid) and a natural law system (the law is moral). I shall then
use this contrast to develop the essential elements of my client's contem-
porary, secular theory of natural law."
Two LEGAL SYSTEMS: POSITIVIST AND NATURAL
"There are several points which are essential to the notion of law
regardless of the culture, society, or political institutions which then host
and sponsor a given legal system. I agree with the point shared by Aqui-
nas and John Finnis that a system containing unjust laws can still be a
legal system in which rules are promulgated and enforced by a recognized
authority. The fact that an unjust system is legal in the sense that rules
are developed and enforced by some acknowledged authority does not
necessarily make the body of law desirable, correct, or unchangeable."1
Still, the system makes and enforces rules, some of which are, or may be,
unjust.
"The fact that an unjust body of law exists within a given legal sys-
tem does not necessarily make that system one which furthers the end of
humankind, the development of human beings and the potential which
they as individual beings can achieve. For example, think of the legal sys-
tems of Nazi Germany, South Africa, or the Occupied Territories. Clearly,
in each of these cases, there is a body of rules established and enforced by
an acknowledged, though not necessarily 'legitimate,' 42 authority which
mon good: "each and everyone's well-being, in each of its basic aspects, must be considered
and favoured at all times by those responsible for co-ordinating the common life." J. FINNIS,
supra note 24, at 214. He further states that "the common good is the good of individuals,
living together and depending upon one another in ways that favour the well-being of each."
Id. at 305.
40 1 T. AQUINAS, supra note 27, question 96, art. 2. This section of Aquinas' work states in
pertinent part that "human laws do not forbid all vices from which the virtuous abstain but
only the more grievous vices from which it is possible for the majority to ab-
stain . . . without the prohibition of which human society could not be maintained." Id.
(emphasis added).
11 For an interesting discussion of whether a legal order which promulgates and enforces
rules of law is to be respected by a succeeding legal order, see L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
LAW 187-95 (1964).
42 In his writing, Professor Fuller examines, through the use of a hypothetical regime which
parallels aspects of Nazi Germany, whether laws enacted by an unjust regime must be en-
forced by a successor state. L. FULLER, supra note 41, at 187-95.
FETAL JURISPRUDENCE
has at its disposal means of enforcing the rules against individuals as well
as groups of people subject to the rules.4 A system of natural law tran-
scends the limitations of a valid legal system which produces and enforces
unjust laws. A legal system developed by natural law goes beyond mere
validity. It is geared to achieve a desirable end, or at least a better state
of existence for all the individuals who are the subjects of the community
governed by the legal system."'
"By contrast, it cannot be said that Jews subject to the law of Nazi
Germany, black Africans subject to the rules of South Africa, or Palestin-ian Arabs subject to the authority of the occupying forces in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip are governed by a legal system which is
designed to attain some better and desirable condition. The Jews were,
and the black South Africans and Palestinians are, governed by the law-
as-it-is, not the law-as-it-ought-to-be. The positivist law-as-it-is promises
neither human fulfillment nor rose gardens; it simply provides valid, al-
though sometimes unjust, rules which are to be followed. If they are not,
the acknowledged authority can, and often does, take repressive measures
of coercion. By contrast, natural law principles seem better suited to offer
individuals greater opportunity for human flourishing.
"The concept of natural law developed by John Finnis provides a
useful scheme for understanding the concept of the law-as-it-ought-to-be
relied upon by my client."
" We do not have to rely exclusively on Professor Fuller's hypothetical state of the PurpleShirts to examine whether specific laws enacted by an acknowledged authority may be dis-
regarded for moral reasons. For example, the decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19How.) 393 (1857), raises grave secular concerns about how one group of people was allowedby valid legal authority to enslave another group of people. Recall the words of Chief JusticeTaney: "[Tihey [the African American people] were at that time considered as a
subordinate and inferior class of beings . . . and had no rights or privileges but such as
those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them." Id. at 404-05
(emphasis added).
" See supra note 24 and accompanying text; see also, K. GREENAWALT, supra note 24, at 17-18; R. DWORKIN, supra note 25, at 412-13. While his view seems to be a more pragmatic oneinfluenced by legal realism, Professor Fuller acknowledges what he calls the inner morality
of law: an aspiration rather than a duty of law. L. FULLER, supra note 41, at 41-44. Yet even
through his realistic perspective, Fuller states that the
one central indisputable principle of. . . substantive natural law [is to] ... [o]pen
up, maintain, and preserve the integrity of the channels of communication by which
men convey to one another what they perceive, feel, and desire ...[aind if men willlisten, that voice, [of the morality of aspiration], unlike that from the morality ofduty, can be heard across the boundaries and through the barriers that now separate
men from one another.
Id. at 186.
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A SECULAR NATURAL LAW SYSTEM
"A secular natural law theory can be extracted from the concept de-
veloped by John Finnis."5 Within a secular based theory, there might ex-
ist a set of basic, practical principles which define or determine the essen-
tial forms of human flourishing."s The forms of human flourishing are
basic goods or ends to be pursued and achieved. In some ways they relate
and lead to the goals of humankind. Second, there is a method of practi-
cal reasonableness, itself an element which will be identified as a basic
good,47 which enables individuals to formulate the third element of natu-
ral law: a set of general moral standards.
48
"While each of these basic goods is inextricably related to Professor
Finnis' concept of natural law, I want to focus on and develop one of his
basic goods as it relates to my client's argument regarding the legal status
of the fetus in the abortion debate. That particular basic good is life."9
See generally J. FINNIS, supra note 24 at 23 (Finnis' definition of natural law).
46 Human flourishing is a term used by Professor Finnis throughout his seminal work on
natural law. Id. at 23, 67, 89, 144, 192, 195, 219-21, 378, 380, 395-96, 398. His concept of
natural law implies that human flourishing consists of the basic goods which are to be pur-
sued and realized by individuals. Id. at 23. He further indicates that human flourishing is
not an abstraction; it is a principle of life to be applied to all human existence by all human
beings regardless of age, sex, physical or mental condition. Id. at 195. Human flourishing
thus seems to be a concept determined by each person through the exercise of his or her
personal attributes and not by some universal, objective criteria. The feminist legal scholar
Margaret Jane Radin has also developed a notion of human flourishing in which she identi-
fies particular facets of human existence that cannot be "commodified" and traded or trans-
ferred. These facets of being human, e.g. the parent-child relationship, are inalienable to not
only the existence but the flourishing of the individual. Radin asserts that it is inconceivable
that elements of human flourishing can be reduced to market rhetoric which "foster an in-
ferior conception of human flourishing, one that commodifies every personal attribute that
might be valued by people in other people." Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L.
REV. 1849, 1927-28 (1987).
17 See J. FINNIS, supra note 24, at 85-90 (identifying several elements essential to individual
human flourishing). In addition to practical reasonableness, the Finnis list includes: life,
knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability (friendship), and religion. It seems that
Finnis considers this list complete in one sense; however, he recognizes that there may be
ways or combinations of ways of pursuing and realizing the seven basic goods, or some com-
bination of them. Id. Finnis contrasts his seven basic goods with the views of other legal
philosophers. He states that H.L.A. Hart's " 'natural facts and aims', or 'truisms' about
human beings, concern the material and psychological conditions ('the setting') under which
persons seek their various ends (and his list of universally recognized or 'indisputable' ends
contains only one entry: survival)" and John Rawls' " 'primary goods' (liberty, opportunity,
wealth, and self-respect) . . .[that] . . . are in general necessary for the framing and the
execution of a rational plan of life." Id. at 82-83 (footnotes omitted).
48 Id. at 23.
'0 The significance which Professor Finnis attaches to the notion of life repeatedly appears
in the natural law literature. See, e.g., supra note 34 and accompanying text. John Locke
stated that "no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions." J.
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Finnis has his own understanding of life which he considers the first basic
value and encompasses 'every aspect of the vitality (vita, life) which puts
a human being in good shape for self-determination.5o I would add that
there are elements of human life that make every human being desirous
of prolonging a physical existence in order to achieve goals that are per-
sonally identified as being important to that specific human entity. Indi-
vidual goals relate to the goals of the community, which in turn relate to
the end of humankind. However, without the opportunity for everyhuman entity to experience 'life' without some third person interfering,
for example, by aborting a fetus, identifying and achieving these goals
becomes an abstraction rather than a reality. In other words, without life
and its continuation, other human goals become, at best, abstractions
having little bearing on actual human fulfillment and flourishing.
"While I will have to elaborate on this point in a moment, I think itimportant right now to say that this interest in life is held by all human
entities regardless of one's personal circumstances. It seems both neces-
sary and universal to our existence as unique individual human beings
that every person, regardless of individual desires, shares this interest inlife with the rest of the human family.5" The goal of each person would
seem to coincide with the goal of every other individual. The law of na-
ture, as I shall explain it, should reflect this mutual goal by generating,
implementing and fostering rules which cultivate the entire community of
individuals' personal goals." 2
LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. II, §6 (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1963) (3d ed. 1698);
see also The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("all ... are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness").
"0 J. FINNIS, supra note 24, at 86. Finnis elaborates by saying that life includes bodily and
cerebral development; freedom from pain; and the recognition, pursuit and realization of
human purpose. Id.
"' Some feminist scholars, such as Robin West, believe that the fetus interferes with and
invades the life of women in an actual or potentially threatening way. West, Jurisprudence
and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 30-32 (1988). Professor Finnis takes a different view con-
cerning the interaction between the fetus and others and the fetus's interest in human life.He argues that the fetus, like the woman bearing the fetus, has his or her own body that
belongs to the fetus and not to the woman. The claim of the pro-abortion advocate that the
woman can, in self-defense, terminate the pregnancy to preserve her own interests improp-
erly and impermissibly interferes with the fetus's parallel claim of self-defense and the pro-
tection of its own future. Finnis, The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion, 2 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 117(1973), reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 148 (R. Dworkin ed. 1977).
2 Profesor Finnis points out that this might be the " 'common good', namely that each and
everyone's well-being, in each of its basic aspects, must be considered and favoured at alltimes by those responsible for co-ordinating the common life." J. FINNIS, supra note 24, at
214.
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THE END OF HUMANKIND AND THE STATUS OF THE FETUS
"At this point, I think it would be useful to do two things: first of all,
I want to show, generally, that the human fetus does have an interest in
the basic good of life; and, second, that this fetal interest in life is the
same as mine or yours."
"While this might be useful, I doubt that you will succeed," com-
mented Tomkins. "I'm skeptical about your interesting thesis. You seem
to be equating fetal existence with life. It seems abundantly clear to me
and my client that, at best, the interest of the fetus is not in actual
human life itself, but rather, is in potential human life."
"All right, Jarvis, let me begin by examining the issue of taking
human life, which I shall subsequently equate with the deprivation of
human existence. Putting aside particular cases of self-defense and cer-
tain types of war, would you agree with me that one person's taking the
life of another is wrong?"
"Well, yes, I suppose so .
"Good. Now let us imagine the following situation: you and I and
everyone else are gathered together. Each one of us has some conscious-
ness of our individual human condition. We also have a consciousness of
the general conditions of the other people with whom we are gathered."
"Well, that would be a rather remarkable occurrence, and I am not
sure that could ever happen, but I'll go along with you on this point,"
responded Tomkins.
"All right, then. So, in other words, each and every person assembled
in this place has an awareness of his or her own condition along with
those of everyone else. Now, let's assume further that, through group
hypnosis and the inducement of a temporary, mild amnesia, each one of
us forgets our precise identities as specific individuals. We have tempora-
rily lost consciousness of our individual identity as distinct persons. How-
ever, each one of us continues to possess the awareness of all the types of
human conditions and experiences present as represented by the individ-
ual experiences of all of the people with whom we are gathered. We just
don't know who actually has what particular experience and concern.53
53 This model is patterned after John Rawls' concept of justice. Rawls begins his theory
with the veil of ignorance and the Original Position. Once the veil is lowered, the assembled
individuals retain an awareness of distinctions of economic, political and social status; they
lose their awareness, though, of who is rich, who is poor, who is powerful, who is weak. J.
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971). I will continue to rely on the Rawls example in the
development of my concept of natural law and the status of the fetus in our society because
it provides a useful tool for enabling people holding different positions on the abortion issue
to experience, at least in the abstraction, other individuals' conditions. In other words, it is a
useful means for putting ourselves in the other person's position, including that of the fetus.
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"Once we temporarily lose awareness of our own position54 and begin
to experience the positions of others, we become more aware of the cir-
cumstances of the other people with whom we are gathered. While we lose
sight of our own position, we experience a growth of consciousness result-
ing from an increased awareness of the conditions and positions exper-
ienced by other people. Throughout this process of evolving conscious-
ness, we begin to ask ourselves, 'I wonder where I fit in? Am I young? Am
I old? Have I just been born? Am I about to die? Am I still within my
mother's womb?' These questions are not only crucial in assessing where
we might stand as individuals in a society, they also make us more con-
scious of the levels and beings of other human existences that we have
not yet known in our own lives or that we have experienced earlier but
now have forgotten. A derivative of this increasing consciousness is that
we can begin to appreciate more levels of human development including
that of the fetus, as we imagine ourselves as a fetus developing within the
womb."
"Now this is all very interesting, Thelma, but where are we going
with this discussion, and what relevance does it have to the abortion issue
and the status of the fetus?"
"Glad you asked. Since we have expanded our consciousness by los-
ing a precise identification with one we can call our own, we can now
better understand the sensitivities of everyone else present, including,
let's say, pregnant women. Not only does our expanding consciousness
make us more aware of the position of pregnant women, it also makes us
more aware of the position of the fetus she carries. I am not saying that
you are or I am that fetus. What I am suggesting is that you and I are
conscious of the existence of the fetus in the pregnant woman's womb.
Each of us can acknowledge that the fetus, like every other human entity
present, has a past, present, and future in this chain of human
development.
"I suggest that because of this expanding consciousness we experi-
ence, it is possible for you or me to imagine our respective selves as the
fetus, as we have been able to imagine ourselves as being every other per-
son present.
"Now let me ask you one question: would you agree with me that up
to this point you have been able to imagine yourself at least as someone
other than your own self?"
"Sure, I guess I might be able to see how I could be someone else in
By "position," I mean both the individual characteristics a human being possesses, such
as sex, capabilities, disabilities, physical makeup, personal likes and dislikes, as well as age,
occupation, intellectual capabilities, professional accomplishments, etc. In short, a "posi-
tion" for each person is something that can and does change; it represents a person at a
given point in the continuum of his or her personal human development.
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that room."
"Okay. Has this experience of seeing small children, persons in their
teens, young adults, middle-aged people, and older folks in any way al-
lowed you to recall any of the stages in your own life?"
"I suppose it has."
"Good. Now let's imagine that you and I are the fetus that one of the
pregnant women is carrying. Does imagining that you are now one of the
fetuses remind you that, even though you may have had no actual con-
sciousness of your own fetal development, you were at one time a fetus
being carried by your mother?"
"Well, yes, but . .. ."
"And can you acknowledge that each one of us gathered in this room
would have had our own respective fetal experience?"
"I suppose so .... "
"All right. Now let us make some conclusions about this amnesic ex-
perience. Would you agree with me that because of what has gone on
during this experience that all who are gathered might have obtained
some new insight into the conditions of all others gathered?"
"Yes."
"And would you say that this same experience has also made those
present more conscious of both different conditions of life as well as dif-
ferent stages of human development from the earliest to the latest?"
"Ummm," Tomkins assented. "But I don't think I care for the direc-
tion in which you are leading me."
"Since we have identified that there is something common to all
gathered, namely the experience of human development and its correla-
tive life, can we also say that each of these individuals with whom we
have vicariously shared experiences that there is also some goal or future
to which we all aspire that we might call for the sake of our investigation,
happiness?"
"So far, I think I can go along with that."
"Fine. Now would you agree that this goal I have identified as happi-
ness is something shared by each person with whom we have exchanged
experiences through the imagined group amnesia?"
"Again, I suppose so . ... "
"Now let's tie together some of these points we have agreed upon.
First of all, we have both imagined ourselves in the position of everyone
else, and we have agreed that everyone else has similarly participated in
this exchange with the others. Second, we have seen that each person has
recognized that there are elements of human existence that everyone
shares, including those of development from the earliest to the latest
stages of being human. Third, we have seen that inextricably related to
this human evolution is the point that each member of this group has his
or her own goal and that everyone similarly enjoys some unique goal that
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is a sense of happiness which we might say allows each person, in that
person's own way, to progress through the levels of human development
in a unique way related to each person's individuality. Finally, each per-
son recognizes the importance of preserving the health and safety of all
others because, in short, it is a way of guaranteeing the health and safety
of one's own self-interests.55
"Now, let me resume the examination we were pursuing a moment
ago. Would you agree that it would be wrong for one person to interfere
with another person's human development, as this development may lead
to the achievement of that individual's goals and personal happiness?"
"Yes, generally I think that I would agree."
"Okay. You and I have put ourselves into the position of everyone
else. Also, we both recognize and acknowledge that each individual has
some future interest in further developing as a human being. Moreover,
the community of individuals brought together in this amnesic experience
has recognized that they are all united. Each has individual goals, so that
it would generally be wrong for one individual to interfere with the devel-
opment and achievement of goals by someone else into whose position we
have placed ourselves.
"We have also placed ourselves in the position of the fetus, and, by
operation of this shared experience, I suggest that you and I would not
want some other individual to interfere with our future goals for which we
may have not yet planned, considering our fetal state, but which we will
someday experience. Both of us, Jarvis, can look back in time and admit
that neither of us, as a fetus, would want some person to come along and
interfere with our future by terminating the pregnancy with which our
fetal state was associated. If that were to happen, our future, our goals,
indeed, our happiness would have been deprived without our consent."
"Now just a minute, Thelma, I think I've been pushed into some-
thing that I don't agree with. You are saying that this fetus is a person
which shares the goal of future happiness that everyone else who partici-
pated in this group amnesia has. Now I'll agree that each individual who
is consciously aware of all the positions has a better sense of understand-
ing the many experiences represented by the people in your hypothetical,
55 See J. RAWLS, supra note 53, at 178. An important element of Rawls' theory of justice is
the notion of protecting one's own interests (self-respect) by protecting the interests of
others. By each person looking after him or herself, one's interest in self-protection relates
to the need to respect the same or identical interests held by all other people. Id. Rawls
posits the maximin rule which, in part, is used to establish the alternatives which each per-
son would find minimally acceptable by and for all others. Id. at 152. John Finnis suggests
that the Rawlsian theory rests on "nothing more adequate than an appeal to the individual
'prudence,' in the sense of cautious self-interest." Finnis, The Authority of Law in the Pre-
dicament of Contemporary Social Theory, 1 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL. 115, 129
(1984).
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but a fetus has no consciousness."
"Perhaps not at the particular moment of being a fetus. But, in our
hypothetical, amnesic experience, we both found ourselves in the position
of the fetus along with every other position as determined by the diver-
sity of individuals present. And you have agreed that each one of the
individuals present has shared the same experience of being a fetus at
some point in his or her human evolution. I submit, then, that if a third
party were to come along when you, I, or anyone else was still in the fetal
stage and terminated our mother's pregnancy, that act would not only
deny us of the ability to establish our goals that we saw ourselves estab-
lishing in the hypothetical but would, in reality, deprive us of our contin-
ued existence and development. This abortion, moreover, would ulti-
mately deprive us of the happiness which each person pursues in an
individual way."
"My conclusion is that because of this shared experience of human
evolution and development recreated in my hypothetical, the termination
of a fetus's development by another person would be wrong because it
could prejudice the future development of each and every person. In es-
sence, we all could have had our happiness and future development
wrongfully deprived because we were all fetuses at one time.
"This point leads me to a further one. Since every human being has
shared the experience of human development, every person who has ever
walked the face of this earth could have had his or her happiness wrong-
fully interfered with by termination of the pregnancy with which his or
her fetal state was associated.
"In summary, each and every person who has lived has survived the
period of fetal development and been born into this world. It is necessary
then, for each of the people born into this existence to survive fetal devel-
opment. Survival of this fetal development is essential to further human
development and is a universal experience shared by each and every
human being; no person has been born without experiencing conception
and development that began with their father's sperm fertilizing the
ovum produced by their mother.
"The necessity and universality of fetal development is significant
not only to our own development as individuals but to the future genera-
tions which will constitute the membership of our societies and our
human race. The future of humankind is fundamentally and inextricably
related to the integrity of fetal development in general and to the safe
keeping of individual fetuses in particular."
"Now just one minute, Thelma. Do you mean to tell me that you are
conferring upon each and every fetus some connection between potential
life and the survival of the human race?" queried Tompkins.
"I think you hit the nail on the head, Jarvis! I believe that there is a
case to be made that this connection not only exists but that it is also
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vital to the continuation of the human race. This connection with the
continuation of the species is, first of all, based on the expectation, which
each one of us has that our fetal development will not be interfered with
so that our own future can materialize. Second, our fetal development
may, in principle, be related to the continuation of the species because if
each fetus's development is threatened by termination before birth, thehuman species could sooner or later become extinct if no restraints are
placed on the third party's ability to terminate any and all pregnancies."
"Another way of analyzing this point is to allow each fetus to developfully so that its gestation culminates in a live birth. Now, if each woman
who bore a child could extinguish the life of that child at birth without
any consequences or without any restrictions from the rest of society, it
would be possible that the human race could die out. Let's take this same
situation in which a person could, without any restraint by society, termi-
nate any pregnancy, we would again have a situation in which the contin-
uation of the human species would be threatened.
"I submit that society should be concerned with the preservation ofhuman life because a fetus is a living, developing, human entity possess-ing its own unique genetic composition even though it may, for a time, be
dependent on the protective and nutritive environment of the womb."7Certainly, when we look at our own western culture, we recognize that our
social and political institutions have, through the development of law,been most interested in the protection of the species from individual as
well as widespread extinction.5"
"Now, Jarvis, let me ask you a question: would you agree with me
" See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
" While stating that for the first few months a fetus is incapable of life outside of the
womb, Professor Greenawalt points out that a fetus is a living and growing entity possessing
its own human genetic composition. Greenawalt, supra note 8, at 374. A parallel view is
advanced by Professor Finnis. J. FINNIS, supra note 51, at 151.
"' Archibald Cox has addressed society's interest in prohibiting abortion and argues that
society does have a compelling interest in prohibiting abortion. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SU-
PREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1976), reprinted in 2 HUM. L. REV. 15, 16 (1976).
This prohibition would maintain a respect for "the paramount sanctity of human life which
has always been at the centre of western civilization, not merely by guarding 'life' itself,however defined, but by safeguarding the penumbra, whether at the beginning, through
some overwhelming disability of mind or body, or at death." Id.
Some American courts have taken action to preserve this interest in the sanctity ofhuman life in utero. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court ordered that a blood
transfusion be administered contrary to a woman's religious beliefs in order to save the life
of her unborn 32 week old fetus. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson,
42 N.J. 421, 423-24, 201 A.2d 537, 538 cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964). More recently, theUnited States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has found that an employer did notdiscriminate by prohibiting a pregnant woman from certain types of employment if the jobposes a potential risk to her unborn child. Schmidt, Risk to Fetus Ruled as Barring Womenfrom Jobs, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1989, at A16.
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that society has an interest in protecting the newborn because it both
safeguards the life of the individual infant and it helps continuation of
the human race?"
"Again, I would go along with this, but I suppose you will attempt to
show that the interests of the newborn are identical to those of the fetus,"
answered Tompkins.
THE TAKING OF HUMAN LIFE: HOMICIDE VERSUS SELF-DEFENSE
"Well, yes, in a moment. But first bear with me as we look at the
taking of the life of the newborn. Now you have agreed that the taking of
the newborn's life would be wrong. And, you further agree that society
has its own interest in seeing that each newborn's life is preserved. Now
let us begin by stating that, in general, our society does not permit the
taking of human life after birth. However, let us also presume that society
permits one individual to take the life of another under certain, fairly
well described circumstances which we call self-defense. We identify the
impermissible taking of a life as a homicide, and we designate the second
taking which may be justifiable under a society's law as self-defense."
"Now, Jarvis, let's see if we can identify any situations in which it
would be permissible within societal norms, as defined by law, to kill an-
other in an act of self-defense.60 Let's take, for example, a situation in
which one person is being attacked by another and the person being at-
tacked has not provoked the attack nor done anything else which might
justify the attacker's action. Let us also call the victim of the unprovoked
attack an innocent. Now, what, if anything may the person being at-
tacked do that would be permitted under conventional legal norms?"
"I suppose," replied Tompkins, "that the individual under attack
would be permitted to use whatever force might be necessary and in pro-
portion to the attack to repel the attack and preserve herself."
"All right, so we agree that under generally recognized norms of self-
defense, the person under attack may respond with the level of force nec-
59 I will not address in this paper a third possible category of the taking of life, that in-
volved in the context of war. Natural lawyers as well as many others have, over the centu-
ries, debated the justification of certain types of armed conflict. Aquinas himself discussed
such taking of life. 2 T. AQUINAS, supra note 27, at II-II, question 40. Put concisely, Aquinas'
view on the taking of life during a war may be permissible if three legal requirements are
met, i.e., (1) the sovereign under whom the combatants will wage war has the authority to
declare and wage war; (2) there is a just cause which authorizes the combat; and (3) the
combatant must be guided by the intent of achieving good and avoiding evil. Id. It would
seem plausible to add principles about the protection of noncombatants, i.e., innocents.
'0 Again, Aquinas recognizes that not all life-taking is impermissible. There are situations
which generally come under the norm of self-defense in which one person may, but not
always, take the life of another to preserve his own. 2 T. AQUINAS, supra note 27, at II-II,
question 64, art. 7.
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essary to repel the attacker and the evil associated with the attack."
"Another issue which can arise in the assessment of whether the tak-ing of another's life can be condoned is generated by one person acciden-
tally killing another. It would seem important to investigate and deter-
mine the intent of the person who kills another.62 Now, intent should be
carefully examined. If a person intends to strike another, but only with a
soft blow which could not reasonably be expected to harm the other, yet
the other suffers a serious injury that results in death, we might conclude
that the death was a result of an accident in that the intent of the person
striking was to administer a soft blow which could not reasonably be fore-
seen to cause the death of the person who received the blow. While ourinvestigation may show that the person who struck the other was negli-
gent in some way and may owe a duty to the victim or the victim's estate,
we would most likely conclude that the resulting death was an accident.However, if the person striking the blow did so knowing that such a blow
could reasonably be foreseen as fatal, then it would be difficult, if notimpossible, to conclude that the death was an accident. It would beproper to conclude that the death was intentional and produced by the
voluntary act of the first person.
"More generally, if a person takes action which can be reasonably
foreseen as harming another person, even though the first person causing
the action does not specifically intend to harm the other, the action can-
not be construed as accidental if the second person is hurt. For example,
if a person contaminates a carton of milk with poison and a second indi-
vidual drinks the adulterated milk and subsequently dies as a result of
the poison, the death is not accidental. I suggest that this death was in-
tentional in the sense that it was reasonably foreseeable that some person
would come along and drink the poisoned milk.
"Another illustrative example of what distinguishes an accident from
a homicide is the following: let's say that a motorist gets in her car anddrives off. Unbeknownst to her, there is a mechanical failure with the
01 The use by the victim of force proportional to the degree of force used by the attacker is
consistent with the self-defense principle contained in the common law that a victim is per-
mitted to use that degree of force reasonably necessary to avoid the foreseeable conse-quences of the attack. Obviously, the facts known by the victim are crucial to determine thelevel of force permissible that may be used in warding off and neutralizing the attack. For a
rich discussion of the facts needed to be examined in determining whether a particular level
of force (including deadly force) used in self-defense is justifiable, see K. Greenawalt, "Ob-jectivity and Law: Law's Treatment of People in an Objective Way" at The Julius RosenthalLectures, Northwestern University Law School (March 14, 1989). The intent of the attacker,
according to Professor Greenawalt, may be a relevant factor to be considered in determining
what level of force may be used in self-defense.
62 See T. AQUINAS, supra note 27, at II-Il, question 64, art. 8 for Aquinas' investigation of
the relationship between intent and the killing of another.
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brakes. She sees a man ahead crossing the street, and she begins to apply
her brakes. Now, if the brakes had been operating properly, she would
have stopped the car in time. However, due to the unknown defect, she
cannot stop her car and she strikes the pedestrian and kills him. Again,
while the driver may have some liability based on a negligence theory, she
cannot be said to have intended to kill the pedestrian. Consequently, the
resulting death is more like an accident than it is a homicide.
"However, let us say that the motorist once again gets in her car. She
drives away from the curb and proceeds down the street. She once again
sees the pedestrian crossing ahead in front of her line of travel. This time,
she does not apply the brakes. Instead she accelerates her car knowing
that in all likelihood she will hit the pedestrian and that he will probably
sustain serious, if not fatal, injuries. Here, there is no accident but the
homicide of another person. I call this action homicide rather than an
accident because the intent of the motorist was to strike the pedestrian
with a force reasonably known to cause serious, and probably fatal,
injury."
"Now, Thelma, this is all very interesting, but what has all this dis-
cussion got to do with your contention about some secular natural law
argument against abortion? Remember, a moment ago you said that you
would identify the interests shared by the fetus and the newborn."
SELF-DEFENSE AND SUICIDE
"Please bear with me for a few moments more. I think it useful that
we understand the connection between human beings continuing their de-
velopment and situations which prematurely stop that development. Let's
take the example of suicide. Now, can we assume that in most cases, sui-
cide is wrong, an evil to be avoided?"
"Generally, I would agree, Thelma. But there might be some excep-
tional circumstance in which suicide might be permissible."
"All right, Jarvis. Then let's examine a case in which a woman is
being attacked by a male assailant. Suppose this woman, an innocent, re-
sists the attack for as long as she can. At some point, she realizes that her
attacker is stronger than herself and she has a reasonable belief that her
attacker intends to rape her. Now, would it be justifiable for her to at-
tempt suicide in order to avoid the rape? I hasten to say that this woman
is desperate and she does not want to be raped by the assailant. 3
"The victim is confronted with one of two undesirable situations.
The circumstances are such that the only alternative to rape is to kill
herself. By killing herself, she terminates her existence permanently, but
13 Rape is an evil and something that most people would attempt to avoid. The question
here is may the woman justifiably avoid the rape by committing suicide?
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she avoids the rape. By not killing herself, she is raped, and probably
suffers physical and psychological injuries that leave a permanent mark
on her, but her assailant flees and she is alive. Recognizing that neither
situation is desirable by itself, can we say that by not committing suicide
the victim has a future, albeit one that presents some major difficulties,
whereas by committing suicide there is no future?"
"Well, sure, but what kind of future is that?"
"I guess that's my point, Jarvis. At least it is some future where a life
can be healed and be put back together. If there is no life, then, there is
nothing whatsoever to salvage. I submit that it is better to have a life
which may need much restorative effort to bring it back to normal as
opposed to no life which has no future prospect at all." '
THE MATTER OF ABORTION
"All right, now, Jarvis. I think it time to look at how all of this dis-
cussion relates to the issue of abortion. I have developed a foundation
which I trust shows that by prematurely taking the life of a human being
two things are interfered with: (1) the integrity of that person's own
destiny; and (2) the impact the death has on the continuation of the spe-
cies. I submit that these two points correlate to the human instinct topreserve human life and to combat anything which threatens it. Now, I
think we are ready to step a little further back in time and see if these
same principles apply to the human life developing in the womb, the de-
velopment of the fetus.
"As I have indicated earlier, it seems that your client avoids a ques-
tion that is both crucial to and unavoidable in the abortion debate: how
can a person who at one time was a fetus deny to a present fetus the right
to the human existence we not only claim for ourselves but also labor for
ourselves? 's5
"Again, I ask my question, Thelma: what connection are you making
between the fetus and the newborn?"
"The position to which I am leading is that the intentional termina-
tion of the development of a fetus is not only immoral and contrary to
", Aquinas looked at the issue of suicide as an intentional act that always results in evil
rather than good. 1 T. AQUINAS, supra note 27, at question 90, art. 5. Generally, the taking
of one's own life is an evil. Id. Self-inflicted death contradicts the natural instinct of pre-
serving one's own life. Aquinas did look at the possibility of whether it would be permissible
for a woman to commit suicide to avoid rape. Id. He concluded that it would be unreasona-
ble and against the natural instinct of self-preservation; it would be using a greater evil
(death) to avoid a lesser evil (rape). Id.
"' Alasdair Maclntyre has raised the issue of the morality of abortion by asking "how can I
consistently deny to others the right to life that I claim for myself?." A. MACINTYRE, supra
note 39, at 7.
33 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 3
natural law, but is also a principle so important to the secular interests of
our society that abortion should be considered impermissible and unlaw-
ful. The fetus, like a newborn baby, is or should be highly valued and
protected by our future society and help perpetuate the human race."
"I believe that my previous discussion 7 demonstrates the compelling
social interests that have a secular foundation warranting a prohibition
against abortions. I elaborate here my point that fetuses, like infants and
older children, have the potential for developing rational judgments." Fe-
tuses, infants, children, and adults all participate in the process of 'be-
coming.' 9 The more closely we look at how each of these human entities
will advance to the next stage of human development, the more real and
the less abstract becomes the interest of the fetus.7" While there is some
6 Professor Greenawalt suggests that one reason why newborn babies and "late" fetuses are
"thought to have so much value is because of what almost all of them will become." Greena-
walt, supra note 8, at 376. While I generally agree with the point made by Professor Greena-
walt that potential capacity counts as do present and past characteristics, I disagree with his
use of the word "late" to modify fetus if the modification implies a restriction to only cer-
tain fetuses who have presumably matured to a particular stage in their development. In
most cases, any fetus will become what "late" fetuses will become, future members of
society.
07 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
" Professor Patricia A. King has thoughtfully examined the legal issues concerning the
competing rights between pregnant women and the fetuses they carry. King, The Judicial
Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection of the Unborn, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1647
(1979). I have some fundamental disagreements with her thesis in which she would afford
different levels of protection to fetuses depending on whether they are viable or not, i.e.,
capable of independent existence, outside of the womb. I would generally agree with her,
but not with her qualifications, that the law should recognize the obligation to protect fetal
interests in life. Professor King argues that, because fetuses will develop into rational adults
someday, society must afford them protection to ensure this development. In her estimation,
it is immaterial to argue that, unlike children, fetuses are incapable of interacting with other
human beings (with the probable exception of the mother). King believes that the pre-viable
fetus, like the viable one, is entitled to some level of protection. Id. at 1649, 1673. For King,
the viability criterion represents a fair balance between competing interests of developing
(fetus) and mature (mother) human beings. Id. at 1682-83. As King states, "[tihe interests
of the mother and the viable fetus should be weighed equally in resolving conflicts between
them." Id. at 1683.
9 Judge John T. Noonan, Jr. illustrates how all human existence, including that belonging
to fetuses, is a process of becoming. He states that "[aill human life, whether fetal, infant,
adolescent, mature, or aged, is in the process of becoming." J. NOONAN, THE MORALITY OF
ABORTION: LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIvEs 258 (1970).
'0 According to Judge Noonan, the interest of the fetus in further development is not an
abstraction, it is a reality. J. NOONAN, supra note 69, at xvii. I construe the distinction be-
tween abstraction and reality to mean that the potential development and future life of the
fetus is not hypothetical. It is something which is predictable and will eventually occur if
the ordinary process of fetal development is allowed to evolve naturally and without inten-
tional interference by another human being. In this sense, the fetus's future is real and not
abstract.
FETAL JURISPRUDENCE
disagreement on how much alike the different levels of human develop-
ment are, there is no doubt that each level will naturally evolve into the
next one in ordinary course of events. '71
CLAIMS FOR ABORTION BASED ON HARD CASES
"All right, Thelma, but you cannot deny that all claims to abortion
are alike. I know you have read my amicus brief wherein I examine a
number of distinct issues: (1) the pregnancy is due to some impermissible,
nonconsensual sexual relation such as rape or incest; (2) the carrying of
the fetus to full term would endanger the life of the mother; (3) the fetus
is diagnosed as having some significant and substantial health problem
which threatens the quality of life the fetus would have once it is born;
and, finally (4) the socio-economic situation of the mother is such that
having to raise the child with which she is pregnant will place exceptional
burdens on her and will, in all likelihood, condemn her to a life of pov-
erty. Her ensuing poverty would adversely affect the nutrition of the child
and probably limit the educational and employment opportunities of the
child."
"I realize, Jarvis, that each of these situations which you identify and
discuss presents a difficult human tragedy. None is a simple matter to be
dismissed lightly. However, the secular-based natural law theory I am ad-
vocating contends that notwithstanding these difficult circumstances, the
fetus's interests should prevail over the woman's and that the woman has
no rightful claim to an abortion because: (1) the fetus, as the first stage of
human development,2 commences the process in which a unique and
identifiable individual enters the human race; (2) the fetus is an innocent
who warrants the protection of society; (3) it is wrong to terminate inten-
tionally the existence of an innocent; and (4) it is therefore wrong to ter-
" See supra note 68.
7' The term "development" means that each human being progresses through stages of de-
velopment that begin with the fertilized egg that creates a unique genetic material different
from that of the male sperm and female ovum and continue through a multitude of stages
after birth. Fertilization begins the process of ontogenesis, the development of a unique
human being different from the mother and father. As Doctor Blechschmidt asserts:
a human being'does not become a human being but rather is such from the instant of
fertilization. During the entire ontogenesis, no single break can be demonstrated, ei-
ther in the sense of a leap from the lifeless to the live, or of a transition from the
vegetative to the instinctive or to characteristically human behavior. It may be con-
sidered today a fundamental law of human ontogenesis that not only human specific-
ity but also the individual specificity of each human being remains preserved from
fertilization to death, and that only the appearance of the individual being changes in
the course of ontogenesis.
E. BLECHSCHMIDT, HUMAN BEING FROM THE VERY FIRST: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN ABOR-
TION 7-8 (1981).
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minate a pregnancy by aborting a fetus.
"I begin addressing your points by recapping several points previ-
ously made. The end of the species is to flourish, and to do so, the indi-
vidual members of the human race are inclined to preserve themselves. It
seems that the procreation of life and the need and desirability to pre-
serve the self, which in turn, preserves the species, are interrelated princi-
ples that are consistent with and complement one another.7 3 In order for
the human race to continue, it is essential that the development of
human life be fostered rather than inhibited.
"Ultimately, every fetus that is not interfered with by the pregnant
woman, or some third party, will share either the same or similar interests
and goals concerning the preservation and ends of the individual and the
species. A fetus is an identifiable individual who combines genetic mate-
rial donated by a male and a female and makes a synthesis unique to the
fetus. If allowed to develop, each and every fetus will continue into the
further development of a unique human being. A fetus is not something
other than a human being: it is a human being at that person's earliest
stage of formation. If allowed to evolve, it will share a development every
person experiences who progresses through birth, infancy, childhood, ado-
lescence, and adulthood.7" As the process of human development contin-
ues, each person can individually and collectively look back to see how his
or her personal development is inextricably related to individual flourish-
ing and the flourishing of society."7
THE FETUS IS AN INNOCENT MERITING SOCIETY'S PROTECTION
"We should start off in addressing your difficult issues, Jarvis, by de-
termining whether a fetus is an innocent who merits society's protection.
Since a developing fetus has not had any opportunity to act intentionally
in any way whatsoever, it cannot be in a position to harm another inten-
tionally, particularly the mother who bears the fetus. The fetus must be
deemed innocent because, at this level of human development, it is inca-
pable of intending harm to anyone. In the absence of the capacity to in-
tend to harm another, the fetus must be considered an innocent."
"Well, assume that a child, who is otherwise an innocent, is carrying
a bomb toward a group of people that cannot be removed from the area.
Would these people, in self-defense, be justified to shoot and kill the
child in order to protect this group of people?"
"No, Jarvis, the doctrine of proportional self-defense against an inno-
cent, upon which I shall elaborate in a moment, could not justify killing
" See supra note 58.
" See A. MACINTYRE, supra note 39, at 7.
" See J. FINNIS, supra note 24, at 124.
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the child to save the others. Of course, this would not prevent the group
from taking some action to stop the child; however, killing the child to
stop it would be out of the question. 6
"Since a fetus is an innocent, it would be wrong to terminate the
development of a fetus because it is incapable of intentionally harming
another human entity. Following this reasoning, it would be wrong for
society to consent to the termination of the pregnancy by aborting the
innocent fetus. Since it would be generally impermissible for society to
take any action against the innocent fetus, I would now like to address
the first of the issues you raise, Jarvis: can a woman terminate the preg-
nancy which endangers her own health?"
THE FETUS AND A MEDICAL DANGER TO THE MOTHER
"To look at the broadest scope of this issue, I think we must assume
that this type of pregnancy may not only endanger the health, but also
the survival of the woman. Terminating the pregnancy might be con-
strued as an act of self-defense taken by the mother against the fetus. We
can also assume that the woman, like the fetus, is an innocent.
"We begin then with two entities who are at different points in the
chain of human development and who share the status of innocents. Now,
is it permissible for one innocent, namely the woman, in an act of self-
defense, to terminate the existence of the second innocent, the fetus? Re-
member, under my proposal for a secular-based natural law, an innocent
may take certain, proportional measures77 that are reasonably necessary
to defend one's existence. A redefinition of the question, then, is whether
the woman can terminate the pregnancy which threatens her own life by
prejudicially terminating the development and growth of the fetus?
"I acknowledge that the woman, under narrowly appropriate circum-
stances, may be able to exercise deadly force against her assailant who
intends to do her great bodily harm that a reasonable person would con-
clude could result in her death.78 However, in a pregnancy, the fetus is
incapable of taking the same kind of action against the mother as the
assailant. The woman's response to the threat posed by the pregnancy
must be proportional to the intention of the entity posing the danger. She
may take those medical steps necessary to protect her personal, physical
welfare, but she is precluded from taking any steps, including abortion,
which would prolong her own life but threaten the fetus's integrity. Such
70 It might be permissible to wound the child or stun it to prevent it from advancing with
the bomb. If this were done, however, there might be some duty to render assistance to the
child to save it from the bomb. See infra note 79.
" See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
78 Id.
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steps would be disproportional. While the woman is entitled to take those
steps necessary to defend herself from danger, she may not take the life
of the fetus to preserve her own."
"But isn't the fetus essentially like the assailant against whom a per-
son might be able to take deadly force in self-defense?"
"No. Whereas the assailant intends to harm another, the fetus does
not. My conception of secular natural law"9 would preclude the woman
from defending her interest by threatening the physical integrity of an-
other innocent entity with whom she shares the chain of human develop-
ment.8 0 The fetus's presence in not equivalent to the attack of the assail-
ant even though the life of another is at stake. The assailant intends to
harm, the fetus does not. In essence, intent is an important element in my
theory of proportional defense. While they may unknowingly pose life-
endangering threats, innocents, unlike assailants, do not intend to
threaten. Because of this crucial distinction, innocents, e.g., fetuses, can-
not be defended against by deadly force.
THE PREGNANCY RESULTING FROM NONCONSENSUAL SEXUAL RELATIONS
"I now tackle your next difficult case, that involving a pregnancy re-
sulting from nonconsensual sexual relations such as rape or incest."1
Again, I think it important to portray this kind of pregnancy from the
perspective of the woman who did not consent to the intercourse respon-
sible for the pregnancy. In this situation, the woman is again an innocent
victim of a violent crime: she has been violated and abused against her
will. She did not intend to have the intercourse which produced her preg-
nancy. However, once the fetus produced by this intercourse enters the
chain of human development, the woman is not the only innocent whose
interest is at stake. Again, presupposing the biological progress of the fe-
tus through the earliest stages of human development, there is a second
entity who shares with the woman the interest of self-preservation and
further development.8 2
7' This might be termed a principal directive of secular natural law. Preservation rather
than elimination of life is essential to protecting one's self. However, there is a progression
in the level of harm in the exercise of proportional self-defense: "Where damage is inevita-
ble, it is reasonable to prefer stunning to wounding, wounding to maiming, maiming to
death: i.e. lesser rather than greater damage to one-and-the-same basic good in one-and-the-
same instantiation." J. FINNIS, supra note 24, at 111.
8" See, supra note 51.
"1 Incest can occur between consenting adults. For example, in New York incest is defined
without reference to force, the only consideration being the scienter that you are related.
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.25 (McKinney 1977). However, I include it as a nonconsensual
sexual relation because it often occurs between an adult male and a younger female who
often is in no position to consent to such physical abuse.
82 It appears that the number of abortions caused by nonconsensual sexual relations is small
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"The next element to be addressed in the question of a pregnancy
due to nonconsensual sexual relations is whether the victimized woman
has any supervening right to terminate this type of pregnancy? Again, it
would seem that the woman might have a self-defense argument to the
nonconsensual pregnancy. She can take whatever proportional means are
necessary to ward off her attacker and to preserve and protect her physi-
cal welfare from invasion." It might even be arguable that the steps
taken against the attacker could, under certain well-defined circum-
stances, include deadly force. 4
"However, the proportional steps she could take in self-defense
against the innocent fetus are dramatically different both in quality and
degree. Again, there is the interest of an innocent woman pitted against
that of an innocent fetus. Both have similar if not the same interest in
self-preservation and further human development. Essentially, then, the
woman's ability to defend herself is curtailed when the focus of the de-
fense shifts from the perpetrator of the nonconsensual sexual relations to
the innocent fetus. Whatever steps the woman has against the fetus must
be proportional. Since the fetus is also an innocent, the doctrine of pro-
portionality would not justify the woman in taking the drastic step of
terminating the fetus. Such action would be disproporationate and would
therefore be impermissible on this ground. It would also be impermissible
on the additional ground that one innocent in the chain of human devel-
opment, in this case, the woman, cannot take any action that threatens
the physical integrity and subsequent development of another innocent in
the chain of human development, the fetus. The interests of one innocent
cannot supersede those of another innocent."
A MEDICAL DEFICIENCY Is DIAGNOSED PRIOR TO BIRTH
"The third difficult case you present is that in which the fetus is di-
agnosed as having its own significant and substantial health problem or
deficiency which may reflect on the quality of its subsequent human de-
velopment.8 5 I assume that the health problems you have in mind, Jarvis,
would include serious medical conditions such as physical deformity,
when compared with abortions brought about through consensual sexual relations. Accord-
ing to the 1987 study conducted by the Alan Guttmacher Institute, approximately one per-
cent of abortions in the United States terminated pregnancies caused by rape or incest.
Lewin, Rape and Incest: Just 1% of all Abortions, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1989, at A17, col. 1.
" See West, supra note 51, at 66, 70 (feminist discussion about physical and legal invasion
of woman's interest prompted by pregnancy).
84 See supra note 61.
" By deficiency, I mean some physical defect or mental handicap which interferes with the
person's achieving stages of development normally expected to be attained by the average
person under like or similar circumstances.
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mental retardation, 6 or some other significant condition which will ad-
versely affect the quality of human life subsequent to birth. Termination
of the development of the fetus who is adversely affected by one of these
medical conditions for the sake of the fetus is analogous to suicide of
someone who has progressed further along the chain of human develop-
ment and who is capable of intentionally ending further development by
committing suicide.87
"Premature termination, i.e., euthanasia, of a human entity's exis-
tence for its 'own good' is sufficiently analogous to suicide., Termination
of the fetus's development 'for its own good,' like suicide, and euthanasia,
is invalid and impermissible within my secular natural law theory for two
reasons.
"The first reason concerns the fact that human entities naturally
take whatever action they can to protect themselves from harm and to
preserve their future development. It is natural for human entities to de-
velop and flourish to the highest stage possible and for the longest dura-
tion of time. To terminate prematurely this development, without taking
any steps whatsoever to preserve and protect its future, directly conflicts
with the principles of human development in which every person has a
personal interest, and which interest is shared by every other person re-
garding his or her own development.88 Just as suicide conflicts with these
principles, so too would the termination of this kind of pregnancy in or-
der to prevent the fetus from living a handicapped existence in the
future. 90
"O Professor King argues that to the extent that those born with mental defects are curable
of these conditions, they have "rights." She presumably means those rights which a person
of like or similar circumstances would enjoy if he or she did not have such defects. However,
Professor King further asserts that to the extent that such a person is not curable of such
defects, she is "inclined" to think that these individuals do not have rights. She does hasten
to add that the incurable is not to be treated "cavalierly." King, supra note 68, at 1669
n.109. It seems that Professor King's position could lead to a rationalization for euthanasia
which I condemn. See infra note 87.
" Without further elaboration or explication, Professor King states that defective fetuses
should be treated in the same way as defective newborns. She believes that the problem of
the defective viable fetus, like that of the defective newborn, is not an issue simply of pro-
tecting fetuses, it is one which raises the issue of euthanasia. King, supra note 68, at 1686.
She does not explain her position toward the pre-viable fetus who is diagnosed as having
similar incurable defects.
" I would conclude that euthanasia is like suicide. In both instances, a life is knowingly
taken to avoid some consequence or potential consequence to that same life. See supra
notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
" This is akin to the interest of self-respect which Rawls identifies and addresses. See
supra note 55.
"I Aquinas states that "[t]o bring death upon oneself in order to escape the other afflictions
of this life is to adopt a greater evil in order to avoid a lesser." 2 T. AQUINAS, supra note 27,
at II-II, question 64, art. 5.
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"The second reason militating against termination of this type of
pregnancy is that the fetus has a distinct, albeit future, position in human
society. Our law currently does not permit a severely handicapped human
from being intentionally destroyed because his or her future participation
in society is clouded by the handicap. Put simply, neither suicide nor eu-
thanasia are condoned by our society. Similarly, it would be impermissi-
ble to terminate the existence of the fetus who will continue its handi-
capped status after birth."
SocIo-EcONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS AND ABORTION
"The final difficult case you present is that in which the socio-eco-
nomic conditions of the mother would be adversely affected if she were
required to have and raise this child. The tragedy portrayed here has lit-
tle to do with the propriety or impropriety of the future of the developing
fetus. It has much to do with the ability or inability of our society to treat
its current and future members in a humane way that guarantees all
members of the human race those essentials of a productive human life."
Suggesting that termination of a developing human being is an answer to
this problem is a mistake. The problem is not the developing human be-
ing, the problem, rather, is the system of distribution of essential goods
and services. The solution to the problem is not the taking of life. Rather,
the solution is making available that which life needs, the essential goods
and services which cultivate productive lives and promote human flour-
ishing. Providing for the needs of human beings is simply not a calcula-
tion made in a utilitarian calculus. It is, as Professor Finnis suggests, ac-
knowledging that '[t]he common good is the good of individuals living
together and depending upon one another in ways that favour the well-
being of each.'9 2
" See supra note 47. Some critics of anti-abortion advocates suggest that the latter might
only be concerned about protecting fetuses and make no provisions for supporting a child
once it is born. Since I have argued that individuals and society have a duty to protect the
fetus, they have a correlative duty to support the child in such a way that fosters the devel-
opment of life and the other basic human goods once the child is born. See supra note 48;
see also Greenawalt, supra note 8, at 383 ("The idea that the state simply has no responsi-
bility to care for those who would lack food and shelter if left to private ordering is in
tension with ordinary moral standards concerning reciprocal support and the state's unique
capacity to coordinate."
" J. FINNIS, supra note 24, at 305; A. MACINTYRE, supra note 39, at 156. In a similar fashion,
John Rawls suggests that people agree upon forms of social cooperation to further their own
individual interests which, in turn, seems to further the interests of others. J. RAWLS, supra
note 53, at 15-16.
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CONCLUSION
"Well, Thelma, I must say that you have presented an interesting
elaboration of your natural law theory. However, I have to point out to
you a strong, fundamental disagreement with what you have said. It's no
secret that my client's pro-choice position is inextricably related to the
fundamental right and liberty to choose one's own destiny, including con-
trol over a woman's body, without interference from the state or the rest
of society."9
"I think I understand your position, Jarvis. However, even John Stu-
art Mill acknowledged that when a self-regarding act adversely affects an-
other, the act is removed from 'the province of liberty and placed in that
of morality or law.'94
"Our individual and societal interests in protecting individuals is
something which I have attempted to show is protected by common inter-
ests and secular objectives of protecting not only our individual lives but
the lives of present and future generations. While I recognize the general
rights of your clients, it is important that they similarly recognize those
held by other human interests, including the human interests of future
generations. Moreover, it is important for our judges, including members
of the Supreme Court, to recognize that hard cases like the one we are
involved with require all involved to confront the 'issues as a matter of
principle [as the] law of integrity demands.'95
"When we care for our own individual rights, we must also care for
the rights of others. A natural law that serves secular objectives recog-
nizes the importance of mutuality and reciprocity. This is a point which
even contractualists like Rawls, who are most interested in preserving the
rights of the self, acknowledge.9 Otherwise, Jarvis, I fear that we will be-
come a society of individuals concerned only with preserving self-inter-
ests. This is fine until the rights of one begin to conflict with those of
others. I fear for ourselves and our civilization when we plunge into pre-
93 J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 68 (G. Himmelfarb ed. 1985) (1859). Although H. L. A. Hart be-
lieves that there may be grounds for justifying legal coercion of people other than prevent-
ing harm to others, Hart generally agrees with Mill in the area of morality, and possibly, in
a more narrow sense, sexual morality. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 5 (1963).
94 J.S. MILL, supra note 93, at 149.
"' R. DWORKIN, supra note 25, at 258. Professor Dworkin continues his discussion by stating
that "[i]ntegrity is distinct from justice and fairness, but is bound to them in this way:
integrity makes no sense except among people who want fairness and justice as well." Id. at
263. For an interesting and informative elaboration of the protection of all individual rights
in a system that attempts to achieve fairness within justice, see Hart, Are There any Natu-
ral Rights, 64 PHIL. REV. 175 (1955), reprinted in POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 56 (Quinton ed.
1967).
9' J. FINNIS, supra note 24, at 123.
" See supra note 55.
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serving self-interests without considering the other, including the fetus.
The attitude of individualism-at-any-cost above all else breeds an insensi-
tivity that can lead to unjust, unfair, and undesirable conclusions that
may be tolerated by the law-as-it-is but not by the law-as-it-ought-to-
be.9 8
"While the example comes from American fiction, I think it suitably
describes this insensitivity bred by super-individualism. The story is re-
lated by H. L. A. Hart: 'Huckleberry Finn, when asked if the explosion of
a steamboat boiler had hurt anyone, replied, "No'm: killed a nigger."
Aunt Sally's comment "Well it's lucky because sometimes people do get
hurt" sums up a whole morality which has often prevailed among [peo-
ple].' 9 Hart continues by stating that:
Where it does prevail, as Huck found to his cost, to extend to slaves the
concern for others which is natural between members of the dominant
group may well be looked on as a grave moral offence, bringing with it all
the sequelae of moral guilt. Nazi Germany and South Africa offer parallels
unpleasantly near to us in time.'
"Sadly, this sentiment about which Hart ponders likewise existed in
our own national history. The fiction of Samuel Clemens was indeed a
commentary on the reality of our country's peculiar institution which dis-
criminated against a group of people because they had dark skin.101 For-
tunately, our country was able to eliminate itself of this abhorrent insti-
tution even though its progeny of discrimination still remains in many
areas of our society. Regrettably, a newer peculiar institution, abortion,
still threatens another group and prejudices them by their status of being
unborn."
At that moment, the train lurched forward, the main lighting re-
turned, and fresh air began to pour through the ventilation system. The
conductor announced that full power and operating ability had just been
restored and the train would be proceeding momentarily. Thelma and
Jarvis unconsciously returned to their work as the train began to move.
As one who had sat nearby in the same car with Thelma and Jarvis, I
began to think about what I had heard and what it might have meant to
each one of us before we were born and what it might mean to all future
generations. Smiling to myself, I paraphrased Blanche BuBois.1°'
" See supra note 43.
91 H.L.A. HART, supra note 26, at 196.
100 Id.
... See supra note 43.
'02 Blanche DuBois is the character in Tennessee Williams' play A Streetcar Named Desire
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Somehow, what Thelma had said made sense. I wondered if it would
make sense to those who would hear her later on this day?
who, when asked if she is lost, replies: "They told me to take a street-car named Desire." T.
WILLIAMS, A STREETCAR NAMED DESIRE act I, scene 1 (1948).
